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COMMENTS
DEVISE TO A WIFE OF INTEREST IN REMAINDER
WHICH SHE WOULD TAKE BY DESCENT.
In the case of Kepper v. Schumaker' the testator provided in
his will that his wife should be trustee of all the property until
his youngest child was fourteen years of age and "then my
estate shall be settled and my wife shall have her third."
Testator referred to his second wife who survived him together
with several children by the first marriage. The widow accepted
the provision under the will and cared for the children in accord-
ance with its terms. She then filed a bill in equity asking for
a division of the property so that her third interest might be
set off to her. In 1882 this action for partition was decided
and the decree of the court provided that the widow should take
an absolute fee simple in the land set apart to her as represent-
ing her third interest. Under the Indiana statute at that time
a second childless widow took a fee simple interest in one third
of her husband's realty on intestacy subject to "her forced
heirs," if her husband had children by a previous marriage.2
In the instant case these forced heirs, children of the testator
by his first marriage, brought an action to quiet title to the
property given to the widow in the partition proceedings on the
ground that the widow had taken a third interest subject to their
right of inheritance and not an unqualified fee. The court holds
in this case that since the circuit court had jurisdiction to de-
termine all the rights of the parties in the original partition
proceedings, and no appeal was taken within the statutory time,
the question is now r'es judicata. The result is that the land
goes to the heirs of the widow on her death and not to the
children of the testator regardless of whether this interpretation
of the will by the court in the partition proceedings was right
or wrong.
This decision seems correct. The court in 1882 had jurisdic-
tion over the parties incidental to determining the partition of
the land and it therefore had jurisdiction to determine the extent
of the interest which the parties should take and to interpret
1 153 N. E. 417 (Appellate Court of Ind., Oct. 8, 1926).
2 Section 3339, Burns 1926, which supercedes the proviso in section 24 of
the statute of descent of 1852, being section 2487 R. S. (1881), and section
2644 R. S. (1894). The present section has been enforced since Feb. 24,
1899, and under it the second childless widow receives a life interest only
and the children of the previous marriages receive a fee in remainder.
Thompson v. Henry, 153 Ind. 56, 54 N. E. 109; Cropper v. Glidewell, 52
Ind. App. 52, 98 N. E. 1012. See also 18 Corpus Juris 826.
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the terms of the will for this purpose. While the primary pur-
pose of an action for partition is not to determine the title of
the parties to property, it is nevertheless part of the equitable
jurisdiction of the court fully to determine all the interests
incidental to the partition of the land.3 Subject to appeal in
that action, the decision of the court was final. 4
The question raised in the Kepper case on the merits is an
interesting one, however, and since the court could not properly
decide it in this instance, it may be interesting and valuable to
consider the issues involved and reach a conclusion in keeping
with the authorities on the subject. Under the Indiana law
that applied at that time, a second childless widow was entitled
to one-third of her husband's realty subject to inheritance of
this land by the children of her husband by previous marriages.5
Under this will, however, the wife received all the land in trust
for a number of years and then a devise of "her third." Thus
she received the interest in remainder after the termination of
a particular estate and this interest was less in legal contempla-
tion than the interest she would have received under the statute
whether by descent or upon her election to renounce the will and
take by statute. There is a rule of the common law which
applies in Indiana although not in England today that where
an heir receives exactly the same amount by will as he would
take on intestacy then he is considered to take by descent and
not by purchase. 6 This rule is based on the old common law
theory that a title derived from descent is a higher and more
honorable interest, a "worthier title," than a title derived from
purchase. This is held to be so even though the title derived
by descent is encumbered by a charge to pay legacies or debts,
and the actual property received by the heir in this way is less
than he would receive if he took by purchase.
3Benbow v. Studebaker, 51 Ind. App. 450, 99 N. E. 1033; Irwin v.
Buckles, 148 Ind. 389, 47 N. E. 822; Isbell v. Stewart, 125 Ind. 112, 25
N. E. 160.
4 Long v. Schowe, 181 Ind. 13, 103 N. E. 785; Heritage v. Heritage, 52
Ind. App. 76, 99 N. E. 442.
5 See note 2, supra.
6 "A devise to the heir at law is void, if it gives precisely the same estate
that the heir would take by descent if the particular devise to him was
omitted out of the will. The title by descent has in that case precedence
to the title by devise." "The test of the rule," says Mr. Crosley, "is to
strike out of the will the particular devise to the heir, and then if without
that he would take by descent exactly the same estate which the devise pur-
ports to give him, he is in by descent and not by purchase." 4 Kent's
Commentaries **506, Stillwell v. Knapper, (1880) 69 Ind. 558, 35 Am.
Rep. 240; Robertson v. Robertson, (1889) 120 Ind. 333; 2 Tiffany Real
Property (2nd Ed.) 1893.
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There is the further rule that if the testator creates a partic-
ular estate by will and then leaves to the heir the same interest
in remainder that he would take if the remainder had gone by
intestacy, here also the devisee takes by descent and not by
purchase.7 In the instant case there was a particular estate of
all the property in trust until the youngest child was fourteen
and then the division of the remainder among the heirs. If we
assume by his expression "then my estate shall be divided and
she shall have her third" he meant to give to his wife and
children the interests which they would have under the statutes
of descent if the remainder were left undisposed of, it follows
that in this case the testator has given to the widow the same
interest in remainder by will which she would have received if
the remainder had gone by intestacy.8 The widow, therefore,
took this property by descent and not by purchase. This precise
point has already been passed upon in Indiana in the case of
Thompson v. Turner.9 This doctrine has been supported on the
theory that there is no difference between the widow as heir
and other heirs. Thus if we say that the intent of the testator
in this instance was to give his wife the property she was
entitled to under the statute, then under the Indiana decisions
we must hold that the circuit court erred in the partition pro-
ceedings, and that the widow should have received the property
subject to the claims of her forced heirs.
It seems that this phase of the law in Indiana as enunciated
in Thompson v. Turner is the law in other jurisdictions that
have passed on the question.1 0 It is submitted, however, that
perhaps this conclusion has been reached by an erroneous inter-
pretation of the common law principles involved. The rule itself
is an ancient doctrine of the common law which is justified on
the ground that the heir would want to take the "worthiest"
title and that it was more honorable for him to take property
7 Stillwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind. 558, 35 Am. Rep. 240; Donelly v. Turner,
60 Md. 81; Whitney v. Whitney, 14 Mass. 88, 2 Tiffany Real Property
2nd Ed.) 1893.
8 It will be noticed that the statute by which the second childless widow
takes is one of descent and that it applies to any property which she re-
ceives by intestacy. Here the testator directed that she should have her
third, by which he must mean her statutory third, since the division
of all the property for the widow and the children is directed according
to the statute, "then my estate shall be divided and she shall have her
third."
9 Thompson et al. v. Turner et al., (1910) 172 Ind. 593. See also Denny
v. Denny, 123 Ind. 240, 23 N. E. 519.
10 Gilpin v. Hollingsworth, 3 Md. 190, 56 Am. Dec. 737; Rice v. Burkhart,
130 Ia. 520, 107 N. W. 308.
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by right of descent than by grace of gift. Furthermore, at a
time when in many instances the law required that the property
descend in the blood of the first purchaser, it helped to keep
family estates intact as well as to fulfill the probable intent of
the testator." At the present time, however, the incidents of
a feudal society which made a title by descent more honorable
than one derived from purchase do not apply at all in this
country and the effect of descent upon the subsequent inherit-
ance of property is far less significant now than at common law.
It would seem prima facie, therefore, that this rule which is
applied as a matter of law and regardless of the intent of the
parties and which is justified by conditions that no longer
obtain, should not be applied by analogy. There is no reason
why it should apply here, since at common law the widow was
not the heir of her husband and hence under the common law
system this rule would not apply at all to a surviving widow.12
Of course the rule is generally applied by analogy to the usual
case of new heirs created by statute but where the widow is
made an heir the situation is peculiar. There is ample authority
to the effect that a widow who takes by will and does not elect
to take her statutory dower takes her interest by contract and
not by gift since in taking under the will she waives her statut-
ory right.13 Thus in so far as she is heir to the same extent
as her statutory interest in Indiana, her situation is different
from other heirs who receive their devise under the will as a
pure gift and could not claim it if it were willed to another.
In Egland this whole doctrine has been abolished by stat-
ute; if a testator devises to his heir the same interest which
he would take on intestacy the devisee takes by purchase and
not by descent. 14 This seems the more practical doctrine and
it may well be that the common law rule which obtains in
Indiana should be changed to conform to the rule which they
have had in England now for nearly one hundred years. Surely
the English statutory rule gives effect to the intention of the
testator. Under such a statute the decision of the circuit court
in the partition proceedings would have been right. The inter-
est of the widow was subject to the claims of her forced heirs
only if she took the property by descent; if it came to her by
11 4 Kent's Commentaries, *504 ff.
12 Williams Real Property 85, 2 Tiffany Real Property (2nd Ed.) 734.
13 1 Woener, Am. Law of Admin. (3rd Ed.) 404; Isenhart v. Brown, 1
Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 411; Carper v. Crowl, 149 Ill. 465.
14 Statute of 3 and 4 Will. 4 c 106, s 3 (1832). See Jarman on Wills,
Vol. 1 (5th Ed.) 99. Also Challis on Real Property (3rd Ed.) 239.
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purchase she would take her third interest in absolute fee
simple.
Of course we do not know the theory upon which the court
held that she took an absolute fee simple interest in the property.
If the court held that she took her statutory interest by purchase
it must hold that she took it free from the interests of her forced
heirs although these interests are set forth in the .statute, be-
cause one cannot create by deed inter vivos or by testamentory
disposition an interest in land which is not recognized by the
common law or by statute as capable of being created by the
parties. 15 Thus at common law one might inherit certain
property which on his death would go to the heirs of the first
purchaser from whom he took it by descent, but he could not
create such a limitation or inheritance by deed or will in a third
person. Hence whenever one gives property to another accord-
ing to statute if the transferee takes by purchase he can only
take such interest as the transferor is able to convey and any
limitations on that interest is held void. Thus we have the
common law rule that if one creates an interest recognized by
the law and conveys it subject to restrictions not recognized by
the law, the qualifications are void and the alienee takes the
interest free from the limitations. 0
It is submitted: (1) that the English statutory provision
by which the heir takes as purchaser and not by descent is an
improvement on the common law rule that obtains in Indiana;
(2) that even under the common law rule the courts might have
made an exception in the case of the widow, since she was not
an heir at common law and the common law contemplated that
if she took a devise in lieu of dower she took by contract. In
keeping with these conclusions, it follows that the decision of
the court in the partition proceedings was wrong under the
Indiana law as it is under the law in other jurisdictions where
the rule has not been changed by statute, but that the court's
decision is more in keeping with common law principles than
the rule which now obtains.
PAUL L. SAYRE,
Indiana University School of Law.
15 2 Jarman on Wills (5th Ed.) 16 ff.
16 This assumes that the estate has been created and that the condition
is a condition subsequent. See Hoss v. Hoss, 140 Ind. 551, 39 N. E. 255;
1 Tiffany Real Property (2nd Ed.) 276.
